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Abstract
The veriﬁcation of security protocols has attracted a lot of interest in the formal methods community,
yielding two main veriﬁcation approaches: i) state exploration, e.g. FDR [8] and OFMC [2]; and ii) theorem
proving, e.g. the Isabelle inductive method [12] and Coral [13]. Complementing formal methods, Abadi
and Needham’s principles aim to guide the design of security protocols in order to make them simple
and, hopefully, correct [1]. We are interested in a problem related to veriﬁcation but far less explored:
the correction of faulty security protocols. Experience has shown that the analysis of counterexamples or
failed proof attempts often holds the key to the completion of proofs and for the correction of a faulty
model. In this paper, we introduce a method for patching faulty security protocols that are susceptible to
an interleaving-replay attack. Our method makes use of Abadi and Needham’s principles for the prudent
engineering practice for cryptographic protocols in order to guide the location of the fault in a protocol as
well as the proposition of candidate patches. We have run a test on our method with encouraging results.
The test set includes 21 faulty security protocols borrowed from the Clark-Jacob library [5].
Keywords: Fault localization, patching, replay attacks, security protocols, veriﬁcation.
1 Introduction
Computer security is a major concern for IT. Users are reluctant to deliver conﬁden-
tial information over an insecure, hostile network. Computer crimes have already
yielded countless losses. To ensure security, users use protocols. A security protocol
is a set of rules and conventions whereby one or more agents agree about each others’
1 We are grateful to Alan Bundy, Graham Steel and the reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. The research reported here was supported by ITESM CCEM-0302-05.
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identity, usually ending up in the possession of one or more secrets [12]. Security
protocols consist of only a few messages but amazingly they are very hard to get
right. For example, the detection of a ﬂaw in the 3-message Needham-Schroeder
public key (NSPK) protocol took roughly 17 years [7].
The veriﬁcation of security protocols has attracted a lot of interest in the formal
methods community, yielding two main veriﬁcation approaches: i) state exploration,
e.g. FDR [8] and OFMC [2]; and ii) theorem proving, e.g. the Isabelle inductive
method [12] and Coral [13]. Model checking tools are capable of determining
whether or not a (ﬁnite abstraction of a) protocol is valid. The veriﬁcation process
usually takes a few seconds and, in the case of unsatisﬁability, a counterexample (a
protocol attack) is output. Theorem proving may be slower, but has a wider range
of application, as demonstrated by [13].
Complementing formal methods, Abadi and Needham’s principles aim to guide
the design of security protocols in order to make them simple and, hopefully, cor-
rect [1]. Abadi and Needham arrived at their principles by noticing some common
features hard to analyse among protocols. If these features are avoided, protocols
tend to become more readable and, more importantly, correct.
We are interested in a problem related to veriﬁcation but far less explored:
the correction of faulty security protocols. A ﬂawed protocol is a mal-formulation.
Mal-formulations is central to theory reﬁnement. They often become evident by
the appearance of a failed proof attempt, possibly yielding a counterexample. The
analysis of this evidence often holds the key to the completion of proofs and for the
correction of a faulty model.
The correction of faulty security protocols requires to develop a set of patching
methods capable of dealing with a general class of faults. In this paper, we introduce
a method for patching an interesting class of faulty security protocols, which we have
baptised interleaving-replay attacks. A replay attack is a form of network attack in
which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. 2
According to the Paul Syverson’s taxonomy, [14], interleaving attack is the replay
of messages from outside the current run of the protocol requiring that two protocol
runs overlap in execution.
Roughly, for carrying out our patching method it is necessary to follow a full
veriﬁcation cycle (Section 2). This cycle involves mainly three phases: i) to verify
a faulty security protocol and obtain its counterexample; ii) to patch the faulty
security protocol through a patching framework; and iii) to verify the newer protocol
version. The crux of our patching method lies on phase ii), which rest upon Abadi
and Needham’s principles for the prudent engineering practice for cryptographic
protocols (Section 3). These principles are applied to guide the location of the fault
in a protocol as well as the proposition of candidate patches. To automatically patch
a faulty security protocol, our method ﬁrst analyses the protocol description in order
to identify the roˆle played by all components of each message (Section 4). Then,
it analyses the protocol counterexample, obtained in phase i), in order to identify
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay attack
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non-trivial message parts shared in its runs, and using heuristics, it analyses these
observations in order to both diagnose a possible fault and suggest a candidate patch
(Section 5). We also present the methodology used in the invention of our patching
method (Section 6). Finally, we have run a test on our method with encouraging
results (Section 7). The test set includes 21 faulty security protocols borrowed from
the Clark-Jacob library [5]. In addition, we also report a large number of results to
validate phase iii) using the AVISPA tool.
2 A Full Veriﬁcation Cycle
A full veriﬁcation cycle will aid to security protocol designers in creating best secu-
rity protocols, and thereby, to reduce risks after implementation. This cycle consists
of three phases. In a ﬁrst phase we use a model checker or a theorem prover to de-
tect counterexamples illustrating that the security protocol is faulty. As a result
we obtain an interleaving of (in general) several protocol runs that violate security
requirements modeled within the speciﬁcation of the model checker or the theorem
prover.
In a second phase we must patch the faulty security protocol through a patching
framework. This patching framework is a set of patching methods capable of dealing
with a general class of faults. Each patching method has the form presented in
ﬁgure 1 (name, input, preconditions, ﬂaw and eﬀect). A patching method may be
split into two steps.
The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd out those protocol messages which cause the failure of
the protocol. Our patching method, for instance, makes interesting observations on
the counterexample, using the roˆle played by all components of each message. We
analyzed various protocols for such situations and formalized them as preconditions
for so-called problem location. In section 5 we concentrate on a particular example
(the NSPK protocol) in which the identity of principals is crucial for the security of
the protocol. The violation of this principle can be observed on a technical level of
protocol traces by the fact that message parts that are (in some sense) conﬁdential
in one protocol run are reused in a second.
In the second step of the patching framework we have to change the protocol
in order to avoid the particular fault. Therefore, we use this technical description
of problem location as preconditions for speciﬁc rules that resolve such conﬂicts.
Besides these preconditions, the method has a ﬂaw part that consists of a verbose
description of the ﬂaw it attempts to ﬁx, and the eﬀect part (patch) that formalizes
the changes to be made to the protocol. The changes, among faulty messages,
resting upon Abadi and Needham’s principles. In our patching method, for instance,
principle 3 suggests the solution: we introduce the agent names into the faulty
message part to disambiguate the context in which the message part can occur.
The result is that the messages modiﬁed no longer can be used in both protocol
runs.
In a third phase of the full veriﬁcation cycle we have to verify the new version
of the protocol in order to know whether the security protocol is free of ﬂaws, or in
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the worst case, to be no longer susceptible to the same counterexample. For this,
we must again use a model checker or a theorem prover. In this paper particularly
we have used the AVISPA tool, a model checker, to deal with the ﬁrst and the
third phase of the full veriﬁcation cycle. In the following sections we will explain a
method for patching interleaving-replay attacks in more detail.
3 Abadi and Needham’s Principles
Abadi and Needham’s principles are a guideline for the design of security protocols.
They are concerned with two main issues: i) the messages involved in a protocol,
together with their content; and ii) the trust relations held by the participants.
Principle 1 deals with protocol messages and their content: every message should
say what it means, the interpretation of the message should depend only on its
content. It encompasses principles 3—10. Principle 3, naming, prescribes that
the agent names relevant for a message should all be derivable either from the
encryption keys that have been applied or other data, including the explicit mention
of the agent names. Principle 4, encryption, is a guideline for the correct use of
encryption; it prescribes being clear why encryption is performed (is it done for
providing authenticity? or conﬁdentiality?). Principle 5, signing (encrypted) data,
speciﬁes that the appearance of a signature does not necessarily imply that the
signing agent knows the message content. Principle 10, encoding, prescribes being
careful about message format: principals should be able to associate, from the
message content, which step the message corresponds to of whatever protocol they
are running. Principles 6—8 are a guideline for establishing message freshness and
message association. Principle 6 prescribes being clear about the properties that are
being assumed about nonces; principle 7 dictates being cautious about the use of
predictable nonces; and principle 8 is an account of aspects of prudent practice in the
use of timestamps. Finally, principle 9 prescribes being sure about the acceptability
of the use of a key.
Conversely, principle 2 deals with the participants’ trust relations: the conditions
for a message to be acted upon should be clearly set out so that someone reviewing
a design may see whether they are acceptable or not. It comprehends principle 11.
Trust relations introduce dependencies, e.g. who is to be trusted on the generation
of a session key? Whether these dependencies are acceptable should be founded on
a policy, instead of a logic. 3
4 Security Protocols
As pointed out by [1], most ﬂaws in security protocols have their root in an improper
use of cryptographic primitives. A protocol designer may miss the roˆle played
by a message component or overestimate the security guarantees provided by an
encrypted message. We are currently developing a theory that will allow us to
identify the one or the several roˆles played by each message component.
3 Thus, so far principles 2 and 11 are not used within our mechanism for correcting faulty security protocols.
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4.1 Basic Ingredients
Our method makes use of Paulson’s formalisation of agent population and message
structure [12]. There are three kinds of agents: the server, S, an absolutely trusted
agent, the friendly agents (A,B, . . .), and a Dolev-Yao spy, Spy [6].
Messages comprise agent names, nonces, time-stamps, shared keys (used in sym-
metric cryptography), public or private keys (used in asymmetric cryptography),
and session keys. The notation {|X1, . . . ,Xn−1,Xn|} is used to abbreviate the com-
pound message MPair X1 . . . (MPair Xn−1 Xn). The symbols Kab, Kas and Kbs
denote speciﬁc shared keys; K+a , K
+
b and K
+
s denote speciﬁc public keys; and K
−
a ,
K−b and K
−
s denote the corresponding private keys. The symbols Na, Nb and Nc
denote nonces; and Ta, Tb and Ts denote time-stamps. We write {|M |}K to denote
the encryption of message M under key K.
Unlike Paulson, we specify a protocol as a sequence of steps, each of which is
of the form: n. A → B : M , meaning that, at step n, A sends B the message M ,
which B receives. Notice that each step involves two communicating events: the
sending and the reception of the associated message. A protocol counterexample,
which consists of a number of parallel protocol runs, is then speciﬁed as a sequence
of session steps, each of which is of the form S :n. A → B : M , denoting the nth
step of session S.
4.2 Message Parts and their Roˆles
An agent may play one of two roˆles in a protocol: initiator or responder. An
initiator is the agent requesting a session in a protocol and a responder is any agent
answering to that request. Usually, the initiator starts the run in a protocol, thus:
initiator(P )
def
= sender(P, 1)
responder(P )
def
= {r :Agent |r = initiator(P ) ∧ r = S ∧ r ∈ participants(P )}
where participants(P ) (respectively sender(P, n)) return all the participating agents
(respectively the sender of the nth step) in protocol P .
In a protocol, each message component carries out a speciﬁc roˆle. The roˆle of a
message component can sometimes be found via a syntactic analysis. Following [11]:
A secret distributor is a ciphered message carrying a secret. A secret is a mes-
sage that is never sent in clear during the execution of the protocol. The function
symbol secretDist(P ) is used to denote the set of all secrets in protocol P ; in
symbols:
secretDist(P )
def
= {{|M |}K | {|M |}K ∈ parts msgOf(P )
∧ ∃m∈parts M.∀M1∈msgOf(P ). m /∈msg2set(M1)}
where parts is Paulson’s operation on sets of messages, msgOf(P ) returns the
messages exchanged in protocol P and where msg2set(M) returns the set of com-
ponents comprising message M .
An authenticator is a ciphered message component that is used to provide evi-
dence of the message sender’s identity.
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As shown below, these simple notions allow us to make interesting observations
both in a protocol and in one of its counterexamples.
5 A Method for Patching Interleaving-Replay Attacks
To explain the rationale behind our patching mechanism, we shall show an example
correction of a faulty security protocol, namely: the NSPK protocol:
1 A → B : {|Na,A|}K+
B
2 B → A : {|Na,Nb|}K+
A
3 A → B : {|Nb|}K+
B
The NSPK protocol seems right at ﬁrst glance, but it is faulty. Lowe found
that an intruder could impersonate one agent holding concurrently a session with
another agent [7]:
s1 : 1. A → Spy : {|Na,A|}K+
Spy
s2 : 1. Spy(A) → B : {|Na,A|}
K+
B
s2 : 2. B → Spy(A) : {|Na,Nb|}K+
A
s1 : 2. Spy → A : {|Na,Nb|}
K+
A
s1 : 3. A → Spy : {|Nb|}K+
Spy
s2 : 3. Spy(A) → B : {|Nb|}K+
B
5.1 Failure Detection
In Lowe’s attack, an identical instance of message 2, {Na,Nb}
K+
A
, is used in two
independent runs (traces s1 and s2). The deceived agent, A, the initiator of the
ﬁrst trace, is the intended recipient of both instances of message 2, but she cannot
distinguish who built or sent it. Thus, while B knows that A has recently partic-
ipated in a run of the protocol, he cannot tell whether A is running it apparently
with him.
In this attack, the spy has accomplished an interleaving-replay attack: after
monitoring a (possibly partial) run of a protocol, he has replayed in another diﬀerent
run of the protocol one or more messages, impersonating a friendly agent. As we
can see such runs of the protocol interleave in execution. If the corresponding agent
does not have any mechanism to distinguish who originated an inward message or
whom such a message is intended for, or cannot associate with that message a time
line, then she will be deceived. Often, the messages that the spy selects for replay
contain one or more secret distributors.
Thus, replay faulty security protocols violate Abadi and Needham’s third prin-
ciple, namely:
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Principle 3: If the identity of a principal is essential to the meaning of a message,
it is prudent to mention the principal’s name explicitly in the message.
Patching the protocol by adding the name of the agent sending message 2, B in this
case, as suggested by the third principle, we arrive at the ﬁxing Lowe has found [8]:
1 A → B : {|Na,A|}
K+
B
2 B → A : {|B, Na,Nb|}K+
A
3 A → B : {|Nb|}
K+
B
Our method for patching replay faulty security protocols is shown in Figure 1.
It is a 4-tuple, consisting of input information, preconditions, ﬂaw and eﬀects. The
method is applicable if the method preconditions hold, considering both the input
protocol and one of its counterexamples. Preconditions specify properties of either
the protocol or the counterexample. They are expressed in a meta-logic involving
the symbols introduced in Section 4. The ﬂaw consists of an informal description
of the design principle that the protocol is thought to violate. Eﬀects specify the
way in which the protocol should be modiﬁed. The newer version of the protocol
is expected, in the worst case, to be no longer susceptible to an interleaving-replay
attack, and, in an ideal case, to be robust enough to survive any attack.
Input: Protocol P , Counterexample C
Preconditions (problem location:)
{|M |}K ∈ secretDist(P )
∧ tr1 ∈ Traces(C) ∧ tr2 ∈ Traces(C) ∧ tr1 = tr2
∧ S1 :n1. A → B : m1 ∈ tr1 ∧ {|M |}K ∈ parts msg2set(m1)
∧ S2 :n2. A′ → B′ : m2 ∈ tr2 ∧ {|M |}K ∈ parts msg2set(m2)
∧ (initiator(P ) /∈ msg2set(M) ∨ responder(P ) /∈ msg2Set(M))
Flaw: Protocol possibly violates Abadi & Needham’s principle #3,
the initiator or the responder is omitted in M
Eﬀect (patch:)
For every step in the protocol, n. A → B : m,
where {|M |}K ∈ parts msg2set(m),
add, as described in Section 5.2, A and B to M forming M ′,
and then replace M with M ′ in m.
Fig. 1. The interleaving-replay patching method
5.2 Patch Formation
In our method, patching an interleaving-replay faulty protocol amounts to adding
agent names to a collection of secret distributors. This addition process, however,
attempts to avoid the introduction of redundancies and the introduction of confu-
sions.
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Sometimes the name of a participant agent can be safely deduced in a cyphered
message from the encryption key. So, to avoid the introduction of redundancies, we
apply the following well-known consequences of encryption techniques:
Authenticity in asymmetric cryptography: Any message encrypted underK−b
comes originally from B, as long as B is not compromised.
Conﬁdentiality in asymmetric encryption: Any message encrypted underK+a
can be decrypted only by A (as long as A is not compromised) using his private
key K−a .
Authenticity in symmetric encryption: Anything that A receives encrypted
under the long-term key she shares with the trusted sever, Kas, comes originally
from the server, as long as A did not send it. This applies similarly with A and
the server interchanged.
To avoid message confusion, we look back at the protocol description. We need
to ensure that the new message component or even the entire new message does not
have a structure that is similar to another one in the protocol. In case of a potential
message confusion, we introduce all names using some ordering, e.g. sender ﬁrst and
then responder(s), see CCITT X.509(3) protocol in table 2.
6 Development Methodology
We now outline the methodology used in the invention of our patching method.
Firstly, we distinguished two sets of faulty security protocols:
Development: this class consists of a few protocol examples that were used for
designing the patching method. For this to make sense, the development faulty
protocol must have a similar ﬂaw (at least be subject to the same kind of attack)
and they should be diﬀerent in size, type of cryptography used, participants
(involving a trusted server or not), etc. The method was tested by hand on the
development set before implementation;
Testing: this class contains example protocols used for testing the robustness of
the method, and was considered only when the development was complete. The
testing set includes the development set but also contains examples that were not
used during development.
Secondly, we attempted to keep the development protocol examples as dissimilar
as possible.
Thirdly, we gathered examples from diﬀerent sources, e.g., books, research re-
ports, etc., and from the Clark-Jacob library, which turned out to be the deﬁnitive
source.
For the interleaving-replay patching mechanism, the development set included
only four protocols, namely: the NSPK protocol, the Wide-Mouth Frog (WMF)
protocol, the Denning-Sacco PK protocol, and the Abadi and Needham version of
the Otway-Rees protocol.
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Id Protocol Name Cryptography Attack Fixed
type type
1 Andrew Secure RPC Symmetric CR
2 BAN concrete ASRPC Symmetric IR
√
3 CCITT X.509 (1) (+) Asymmetric IR
√
4 CCITT X.509 (3) (+) Asymmetric IR
√
5 Denning-Sacco SK Symmetric CR
6 Denning-Sacco PK Asymmetric IR
√
7 Kao Chow Auth-V.1 Symmetric CR
8 KSL Symmetric IR
√
9 Neumann Stubblebine Symmetric TF
10 NSPK (+) Asymmetric IR
√
11 Needham Schroeder SK Symmetric CR
12 Otway-Rees Symmetric TF
13 O&R BAN version Symmetric IR
√
14 SPLICE/AS Asymmetric IR
√
15 Hwang-Chen SPLICE/AS Asymmetric IR
√
16 C-J modiﬁed SPLICE/AS Asymmetric CR
17 TMN Symmetric CR
18 WMF protocol Symmetric IR
√
19 Woo and Lam Mutual Symmetric IR
√
20 Woo and Lam Pi (+) Symmetric TF
21 BAN modiﬁed Yahalom Symmetric IR
√
Table 1
The validation test set
7 Results
Once our method has patched a protocol, it is required to know whether the new
version of the protocol is free of ﬂaws, in the worst case, to be no longer susceptible
to the same interleaving-replay attack (phase three of the full veriﬁcation cycle).
For this, we have used the AVISPA tool v.1.0 (Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Applications). 4 For verifying a protocol in this tool, one
must formulate the protocol and the properties to be veriﬁed (e.g. secrecy or/and
authentication) in a high-level protocol speciﬁcation language (HLPSL). Then, we
must prove the protocol into one of the four diﬀerent back-end search engines: the
On the Fly Model Checker (OFMC), the Constraint-Logic-Based Attack Searcher
(CL-AtSe), the SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and the Tree Automata based
on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). The
ﬁrst two back-ends, OFMC [3] and CL-AtSe [15], were used for the experimental
proofs corresponding to phases one and three of the full veriﬁcation cycle.
Tables 1—5 summarise our results. Table 1 includes our validation test set. It
consists of 21 faulty protocols, borrowed from the Clark-Jacob library. The Clark-
Jacob library comprehends 50 protocols, 26 of which are known to be faulty. So our
validation test set contains all but ﬁve known faulty security protocols. The ﬂaw in
the faulty protocols that were left out from our validation test set have nothing to
do with a replay attack.
4 Available via http://www.avispa-project.org/
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In Table 1, protocols annotated with (+) aim to provide authentication; the
remaining protocols aim to achieve both authentication and session key distribu-
tion. The attack type is annotated with “IR”, “TF” and “CR”. “IR” abbreviates
interleaving-replay, “TF” abbreviates type ﬂaw 5 and “CR” abbreviates a classic
replay 6 . Protocols marked with
√
were patched. The patched version of the
protocols are described in Tables 2—3.
Protocol New Description Comment
Name
BAN concrete 1.A → B : A,Na This patch is similar to
ASRPC 2.B → A : {| A, B , Na,Kpab|}Kab that proposed by Lowe
3.A → B : {|Na|}Kpab in [9].
4, B → A : Nb
CCITT X.509 1.A → B : A, {|Ta,Na,B,Nxa, This patch is similar to
(1) {| A , Nya|}
K
+
B
|}
K
−
A
that proposed by Abadi
and Needham in [1].
CCITT X.509 1.A → B : A, {|Ta,Na,B,Nxa, Here, one of two experimen-
(3) {| A , Nya|}
K
+
B
|}
K
−
A
tal patches is presented.
2.B → A : B, {|Tb,Nb, A,Na,Nxb, This patch is similar to
{| A, B , Nyb|}
K
+
A
|}
K
−
B
that proposed by Burrows,
3.A → B : A, {| B , Nb|}
K
−
A
Abadi and Needham in [4].
Denning-Sacco 1.A → S : A,B This patch is the same as
PK 2.S → A : {|A,K+
A
, T s|}
K
−
S
, that proposed by
{|B,K+
B
, T s|}
K
−
S
Abadi-Needham in [1].
3.A → B : {|A,K+
A
, T s|}
K
−
S
,
{|B,K+
B
, T s|}
K
−
S
,
{|{| B ,Kab, Ta|}
K
−
A
|}
K
+
B
Table 2
Patched protocol descriptions, ﬁrst part
Our method is thus able to identify an interleaving-replay attack and a candidate
patch in 12 faulty protocols out of 21. Interestingly, our experiments have shown
that even though our patching method suggests a diﬀerent candidate patch when
input two diﬀerent counterexamples for the same faulty protocol, the veriﬁcation
in AVISPA tool have turned out successful in both candidate patches (protocols 4,
13, 18 and 19).
Protocols that could not be patched lie outside the scope of our method; that is,
they are not interleaving-replay faulty protocols. For instance, protocols 5 and 16
lack of aliveness of the responder according to Lowe’s hierarchy [10]. Lowe’s Patch
5 A type ﬂaw attack is when an agent has no mechanism to identify a ﬁeld that was originally intended to
have one type and it is subsequently interpreted as having another type. For example, an agent that waits
to receive a message of the form {|A,Kab, T b|}KB , receives the message {|A,Na, Tb|}KB , in this case, he
accepts naively nonce Na by key Kab.
6 According to Paul Syverson’s taxonomy [14], a classic replay is an attack not requiring contemporaneous
runs. Classic replays have been identiﬁed lacking a time reference.
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Protocol New Description Comment
Name
KSL 1.A → B : Na,A This patch is similar to
2.B → S : Na,A,Nb, B that proposed by Lowe in
3.S → B : {| B , Nb, A,Kab|}KB , [9]. Instead of adding the
{|Na,B,Kab|}KA responder name B, in
4.B → A : {|Na,B,Kab|}KA , such a secret distributor,
{|Tb,A,Kab|}Kbb, Nc, Lowe changes the order as
{|Na|}Kab follows: {|A,Nb,Kab|}KB .
5.A → B : {|Nc|}Kab The eﬀect is the same,
6.A → B : Nma, {|Tb,A,Kab|}Kbb to make the secret
7.B → A : Nmb, {|Nma|}Kab distributors of step 3
8.A → B : {|Nmb|}Kab diﬀerent one another.
NSPK 1.A → B : {|Na,A|}
K
+
B
This patch is the same
2.B → A : {| B , Na,Nb|}
K
+
A
as that proposed by
3.A → B : {|Nb|}
K
+
B
Lowe in [7].
O&R BAN 1.A → B : M,A,B, {|Na,M,A,B|}KA Similar to CCITTX.509
version 2.B → S : M,A,B, {|Na,M,A,B|}KA , (3) protocol our method
Nb, {|M,A,B|}KB proposed two diﬀerent
3.S → B : M, {|Na,Kab|}KA , patches in two diﬀerent
{| A , Nb,Kab|}KB counterexamples (Here,
4.B → A : M, {|Na,Kab|}KA only one is presented).
Table 3
Patched protocol descriptions, second part
is extending the protocols by adding a nonce handshake.
Tables 2—4 show the output of our patching method. For each protocol, they
describe the new speciﬁcation. Changes amount to the inclusion of agent names,
enclosed in boxes in the new description of the protocol.
Table 5 shows the total elapsed veriﬁcation time (TEVT) and the back-end
(OFMC or CL-Atse) used to verify the new protocol description. The experiments
were carried out on a PC with 1.6 GHz Pentium IV processor and 512Mb RAM.
8 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper, we have presented a method for patching faulty security protocols
that are susceptible to an interleaving-replay attack. Using Abadi and Needham’s
guidance on agent naming, our mechanism patches a protocol by adding the nec-
essary names to the protocol messages so they no longer can be replayed without
notice. The patches proposed by our mechanism are natural, hence making the
fault identiﬁcation and correction processes look pretty trivial. Yet, this is not the
case, since this type of design error has systematically appeared throughout the
literature, as shown in tables 2–4. A recent example faulty protocol susceptible to
an interleaving replay attack is the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, as shown by [13].
We have carried out a large number of experiments to validate our method.
For instance, it has been tested on 21 faulty security protocols (borrowed from the
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Protocol New Description Comment
Name
SPLICE/AS 1.C → Sa : C, S,N1 This patch becomes the
2.Sa → C : Sa, {| S , Sa, C,N1, K+
S
|}
K
−
Sa
version of Hwang-Chen
3.C → S : C,S, {|C, Tc, Lc,{|N2|}
K
+
S
|}
K
−
C
Splice/as protocol.
4.S → Sa : S,C,N3 Although this version is
5.Sa → S : Sa, {| C , Sa, S,N3, K+
C
|}
K
−
Sa
faulty, our method also
6.S → C : S,C, {|S, f2(N2)|}
K
+
C
patches it. See following
row.
Hwang-Chen 1.C → Sa : C, S,N1
SPLICE/AS 2.Sa → C : Sa, {|Sa,C,N1, S,K+
S
|}
K
−
Sa
3.C → S : C,S, {|C, Tc, Lc,{| C , N2|}
K
+
S
|}
K
−
C
4.S → Sa : S,C,N3
5.Sa → S : Sa, {|Sa, S,N3, C,K+
C
|}
K
−
Sa
6.S → C : S,C, {|S, f2(N2)|}
K
+
C
WMF 1.A → S : A, {|B, Ta,Kab|}KA See the following row
protocol 2.S → B : {| B , A, Ts,Kab|}KB comment.
Woo and 1.P → Q : P,N1 Similar to WMF
Lam 2.Q → P : Q,N2 protocol our method
Mutual 3.P → Q : {|P,Q,N1, N2|}KP proposed two diﬀerent
Auth. 4.Q → S : {|P,Q,N1, N2|}KP , patches in two
{|P,Q,N1, N2|}KQ diﬀerent counter-
5.S → Q : {| P , Q,N1, N2, Kpq|}KP , examples (Here, only
{|P,N1, N2, Kpq|}KQ one is presented).
6.Q → P : {| P , Q,N1, N2, Kpq|}KP ,
{|N1, N2|}Kpq
7.P → Q : {|N2|}Kpq
BAN 1.A → B : A,Na The patch is similar to
Yahalom 2.B → S : B,Nb, {|A,Na|}KB that proposed by
3.S → A : Nb, {| A , B,Kab,Na|}KA , Paulson in [12].
{|A,Kab,Nb|}KB
4.A → B : {|A,Kab,Nb|}KB , {|Nb|}Kab
Table 4
Patched protocol descriptions, third part
Clark-Jacob library) and 25 counterexamples. Our method has successfully dealt
with 16 countexamples and has shown to be able successfully to patch 12 of these
protocols.
Our method is usually able to patch an interleaving-replay faulty protocol that
violates Abadi and Needham’s principle 3. But it cannot always deal with replay
faulty protocols that violate a time line reference (classic replays) or run internal
attacks. For example, it did not succeed in patching the Andrew Secure RPC
protocol:
(i) A → B : A, {|Na|}Kab
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Protocol Name Tool TEVT(sec)
BAN concrete ASRPC OFMC 34.34
CCITT X.509 (1) OFMC 0.10
CCITT X.509 (3) OFMC 2.27
Denning-Sacco PK OFMC 0.33
KSL OFMC 17.26
NSPK CL-AtSe 28.8
O&R BAN version OFMC 4.15
SPLICE/AS CL-AtSe 8.43
Hwang-Chen SPLICE/AS CL-AtSe 35.15
WMF protocol CL-AtSe 0.70
Woo and Lam Mutual OFMC 0.35
BAN modiﬁed Yahalom OFMC 0.74
Table 5
The total elapsed veriﬁcation time
(ii) B → A : {|Na + 1, Nb|}Kab
(iii) A → B : {|Nb + 1|}Kab
(iv) B → A : {|Kabp,Nbp|}Kab
Here, the origin of the error has nothing to do with agent naming, but with a time
reference. In particular, notice that nonce Nbp is used as an acknowledgment, but
Nbp’s structure has no relation with Na.
We plan on further validating our method with other faulty protocols. In ad-
dition, we will analyse other faulty protocols, as that presented above, in order to
propose new patching methods.
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